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I. Introduction
On May 29, 2001, after a three-month trial and twelve days
of deliberations, a federal jury in the Southern District of New
York convicted four men, all foreign born, of offenses under a
302-count indictment relating to the August 1998 bombings of
the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania.' The bombings resulted in the death of 224 people,
including 12 Americans, and the wounding of 4,600 others. 2
During the course of the trial, several of the defendants
challenged the admission into evidence of their statements to
American law enforcement officers. 3 In a matter of first impres-
sion, Judge Leonard B. Sand, who presided over the trial, ruled
in United States v. Bin Laden4 that, for purposes of a domestic
criminal prosecution in an Article III court, foreign suspects
who are interrogated abroad by American law enforcement of-
ficers are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections
1. A Verdict Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at A18; Press Re-
lease, FBI, Verdict Rendered in the Trial of Four Individuals Associated with the
1998 Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (May 29, 2001),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel0l.htm. As reported by the press
at the start of the trial:
The terrorism trial ... present[ed] an extraordinary challenge to the impar-
tial administration of justice in the United States. The four defendants
[weire accused of participating in a homicidal conspiracy of terror against
the United States during much of the last decade, including the 1998 bomb-
ing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Because the attacks
were so repugnant, and the defendants [weire foreign-born, the prosecutors
and the court b[orel a special obligation to insure that the case [wals han-
dled fairly and in full compliance with the rights that must be accorded to
every defendant in a criminal case.
The Embassy Bombings Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A18. On October 18,
2001, the four men tried for the bombings were sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. Michael Powell, 4 Bombers Get Life Sentences, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
2. A Verdict Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at A18.
3. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Faces Tough Challenge to Statements in Terror
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A24; Terror Suspect Pleaded to be Shot, Official
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at A28; Benjamin Weiser, Citing Police Tactics,
Embassy Blast Suspect Tries to Suppress Statements, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at
A23.
4. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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against self-incrimination as suspects who are questioned in the
United States.5 Additionally, Judge Sand ruled that statements
obtained from such suspects by American law enforcement rep-
resentatives must also meet the warning/waiver requirements
under Miranda v. Arizona6 before they are admitted into evi-
dence in the government's case-in-chief at trial.7
The application of the Fifth Amendment to interrogations
of foreign nationals abroad who are suspected or charged with
violating American criminal laws presents a recurring legal is-
sue. The criminal investigations surrounding the terrorist at-
tacks on September 11, 2001,8 and the bombings of the
American destroyer USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen in Octo-
ber 20009 and the Khobar Towers military complex in Saudi
Arabia in 1996, present a few notable examples where this issue
may arise again. 10
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, as
5. Id. at 181.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
8. See Dan Eggen & Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Indicts Suspect In Sept. 11 At-
tacks, WASH POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting return of first indictment in
connection with the Sept. 11 attacks); David Johnson & Benjamin Weiser, Ashcroft
Is Centralizing Control Over the Prosecution and Prevention of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at B9 (discussing the establishment of "9/11 Task Force"
within the Department of Justice "to operate as the agency's central command
structure for prosecuting terror cases and helping to prevent further acts of vio-
lence against the United States"); Brooke A. Masters, Any Terror Trials May Be In
Virginia, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at A10 (reporting how Department of Justice
is "leaning heavily" toward prosecution of any conspirators involved in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks in Virginia rather than New York).
9. The investigation of the bombing of the USS Cole, which killed 17 sailors,
has not yet resulted in the filing of any charges. See Kamran Khan & Rajiv Chan-
drasekaran, Cole Suspect Turned Over By Pakistan, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at
Al; Walter Pincus, Yemen Hears Benefits of Joining U.S. Fight, WASH. POST, Nov.
28, 2001, at A8; U.S Seeks To Resume Probe of Cole Blast, WASH. POST, August 22,
2001, at A15.
10. On June 21, 2001, nearly five years after a truck bomb ripped through the
Ehobar Towers military housing complex in Saudi Arabia killing 19 Americans
and wounding 372 others, a 46-count indictment was returned against 13 mem-
bers of the pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah or "Party of God" in the Eastern District of
Virginia charging, in part, conspiracy to kill Americans and employees of the
United States, use of weapons of mass destruction, and destruction of United
States property, bombing, and murder. Press Release, FBI, Khobar Towers Re-
lease (June 21, 2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01.htm.
3
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shaped by Miranda, applies to a non-resident alien interrogated
abroad by American law enforcement officials." The developing
case law, however, suggests that a confession elicited from a
non-resident alien abroad by American law enforcement repre-
sentatives must be voluntary before it is admitted into evidence
in a United States court and that (at least) modified Miranda
warnings must also be given to non-resident aliens who are in-
terrogated abroad by American law enforcement officers. 12
This article, which is divided into two parts, explores these
issues. First, it provides a brief overview of the history, evolu-
tion, and goals of the Fifth Amendment privilege, together with
a general discussion about the law governing confessions. The
article then discusses the case law analyzing the admissibility
of confessions when non-resident aliens and foreign law enforce-
ment officials are involved.' 3 Particular emphasis is placed on
Judge Sand's ruling in Bin Laden, an opinion which may serve
as the legal cornerstone for future cases that are confronted
with the application of the self-incrimination clause to state-
ments elicited from a non-resident alien who is interrogated
abroad by American law enforcement representatives and
thereafter prosecuted in an American court.
11. Neither has the Supreme Court, for that matter, ruled on whether the
remaining Fifth Amendment procedural guarantees of indictment by grand jury
and bar on double jeopardy apply to a non-resident criminal defendant tried in an
Article III court. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
12. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order authorizing, at his
discretion, the trial of non-U.S. citizens in military tribunals who are determined
to be either present or former members of al Qaeda, associated with international
acts of terrorism (including the attacks on September 11), or harbored such per-
sons. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001); see also William Glaberson, Closer Look at New
Plan for Trying Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at B6; George Lardner Jr. &
Peter Slevin, Military May Try Terrorism Cases Bush Cites 'Emergency,' WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al. The use of the term "court" in this article, and the
discussion of a non-resident alien's Fifth Amendment protection against self-in-
crimination, are presented strictly in the context of a criminal prosecution under
an Article III court and not a military tribunal.
13. Throughout this article, the terms "statement," "admission," and "confes-
sion" are used interchangeably.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss1/1
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II. Overview
A. History and Evolution of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
The roots of the privilege against self-incrimination lie in
medieval English common law.14 By 1650, the privilege was es-
tablished firmly in the common law of England. 15 By the early
eighteenth century, the English common law courts applied the
privilege to defendants and then to witnesses. 16
During the second half of the seventeenth century, Ameri-
can "colonists began to recognize the privilege as a common law
right. This recognition invariably coincided with movement by
the British administrators to repress political dissidence."17
Soon after the colonists declared their independence, eight of
the thirteen colonies incorporated a privilege against self-in-
crimination in their state constitutions.' 8 In 1791, the privilege
14. See Christine L. Reimann, Fencing the Fifth Amendment in Our Own
Backyard, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 177, 178-79 (1995); Kevin Urick, The Right Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination in Early American Law, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 107, 108-15 (1988).
15. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). As explained by one
commentator:
To ensure individuals answered truthfully, the English Ecclesiastical
Courts required religious and political dissidents questioned by the infa-
mous Star Chamber to swear to the oath ex officio. Refusing to take the
oath was rare because it was the equivalent to a guilty plea. Due to zealous
inquisitorial techniques, including torture, witnesses testifying under the
oath inevitably disclosed everything under investigation. The Star Cham-
ber, and the oath ex officio along with it, were abolished by the British Par-
liament in the seventeenth century. The abolishment gave rise to the right
against self-incrimination in both ecclesiastical and common law courts.
The rationale underlying the prohibition of the oath ex officio was the belief
that it was fundamentally unfair to be forced to choose between liberty or
violating the oath.
Anthony L. Osterlund, Comment, Showdown at the Constitutional Corral: Self-
Incrimination v. Potential Foreign Prosecution, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 618 (1999);
see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) ("The Court has thought
the privilege necessary to prevent any recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star
Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality.") (citation omitted).
16. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1451 (11th Cir. 1997).
17. Id. at 1453. "For example, in 1677, the legislature of Virginia reaffirmed
the ban on sworn interrogation after Governor Berkeley summarily executed a
number of alleged participants in Bacon's Rebellion on the basis of confessions
compelled through torture." Id.
18. Id. at 1454-55. The eight colonies were Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and North Carolina. Id. In
5
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against self-incrimination became part of the federal Bill of
Rights. 19
As part of the Fifth Amendment,20 the common law right
against self-incrimination was converted into a constitutional
privilege which no state could modify through statutory enact-
ments.21 For well over fifty years, however, because the states
and the federal government were deemed independent sover-
eigns, the law permitted each government to compel a witness
to provide testimony, even though the witness would incrimi-
nate himself under the other sovereign's laws.22 This changed
with Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,23
when the Supreme Court ruled that a "state witness [could] not
be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits
most instances, the privilege applied only to criminal defendants. Id. See gener-
ally Urick, supra note 14, at 115-16.
19. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161.
20. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. In Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Court made clear
that "[legislation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the Constitution."
Id. at 565. It ruled that no statute which leaves a witness susceptible to prosecu-
tion after he incriminates himself can "supplant[ ] the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of the United States." Id. at 585. A distinguished commentator de-
scribed the incorporation of the principle that no one should be required to accuse
himself as "'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civi-
lized.'" Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,426 (1956) (quoting ERWIN N. GRIS-
WOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955)).
22. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1958) (holding that
states could compel a witness to give testimony that would incriminate him under
federal law); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 68-69 (1906) (recognizing that potential
federal prosecution did not justify a witness's silence when immunity from state
prosecution is afforded); see also Diego A. Rotsztain, The Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1940, 1946-50 (1996).
23. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). The same day Murphy was decided, the Court ruled in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the privilege against self-incrimination
was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss1/1
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[could] not be used in any manner by federal officials in connec-
tion with a federal prosecution against him."24
B. Goals of the Self-Incrimination Clause
The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself[.]" 25 When ascertaining the
meaning of this clause, the Supreme Court has noted that it
"must have a broad construction in favor of the right which it
was intended to secure."26 In now familiar language, the Court
in Murphy explained that the privilege embodied in the self-in-
crimination clause
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of a crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requir-
24. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79. In United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998),
the Supreme Court ruled that a resident alien with a real and substantial fear of
foreign prosecution could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when the government sought to compel his testimony because the
"concern with foreign prosecution" was beyond the scope of the clause. Id. at 669.
The Court "read the [clause contextually as apparently providing a witness with
the right against compelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecu-
tion by the government whose power the [clause limits, but not otherwise." Id. at
673-74.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562; accord Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479, 486 (1951); Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162. As observed by the court in DeLuna v.
United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962):
Because the right [against self-incrimination] is the result of successive ac-
cretions, it is not as severely bounded by historical origins, surveyed as of an
early time, as are some legal institutions. It is more important to consider
its line of growth as indicative of an expanding right capable of encompass-
ing new and novel situations today as in the past. If the expansion of the
individual's right of silence comes at the expense of the power and efficiency
of the State, that is but in accord with the nature of the right and its histori-
cal development. [Bloth the safeguard of the Constitution and the common
law rule spring alike from that sentiment of personal self-respect, liberty,
independence and dignity which has inhabited the breast of the English
speaking peoples for centuries, and to save which they have always been
ready to sacrifice any governmental facilities and conveniences.
Id. at 150 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original; quotation omitted).
7
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ing the government to leave the individual alone until good cause
is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our re-
spect for the inviolability of the human personality and the right
of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a pri-
vate life; our distrust for self-deprecatory statements; and our re-
alization that the privilege while sometimes a shelter to the
guilty, is often a protection of the innocent.2
7
Part of the inquiry then becomes whether the application of the
privilege to a non-resident alien who is interrogated by Ameri-
can law enforcement officials abroad advances or is consistent
with the policies and purposes of this privilege - respect for
individual dignity and privacy, the preservation of an accusato-
rial system, and the prevention of governmental overreaching. 28
C. Voluntariness and Miranda
The early Supreme Court decisions regarding the admissi-
bility of confessions in federal courts relied upon the common
law rule29 designed to protect a defendant from being convicted
based on a false confession.30 The rule originally was formu-
lated, at least in part, in terms of whether there had been a
forbidden inducement, threat, or promise. 31 The test was ex-
panded so that the question became whether the confession
27. 378 U.S. at 55 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
28. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) ("At its core, the priv-
ilege reflects our fierce unwillingness to subject those suspected of a crime to the
cruel [choice] of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.") (quotation omitted); United
States v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) ("The Fifth Amendment privi-
lege... protects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and pros-
cribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.") (quotation omitted).
29. This rule appears to have been first promulgated in The King v. Warick-
sall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 233 L. Leach Cr. Cases 263 (K.B. 1783), where the court
stated:
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it
is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore is admit-
ted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questiona-
ble a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit
ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.
Id. quoted in 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at 442 (2d ed. 1999).
30. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.2(a), at 442.
31. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) ("there seems to have been no
reason to exclude the confession of the accused; for the existence of any such in-
[Vol. 22:1
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"was, in fact, voluntarily made."32 Early on, in federal prosecu-
tions, exclusion of an involuntary confession was based on the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination where, 33
after some questioning, 34 it came to rest.3 5
Cases applying the voluntariness test in the context of con-
fessions in state prosecutions, the admission of which the Court
found violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,36 generally reflect three underlying concerns.37 First,
there is the concern that these confessions "are of doubtful reli-
ability because of the practices used to obtain them."38 A second
ducements, threats or promises seems to have been negatived by the circum-
stances under which it was made").
32. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924) ("In the federal
courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that
the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary
in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.").
33. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court held:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue
is controlled by that portion of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal trial to be a witness against himself[.]'
Id. at 542.
One commentator has remarked that that Bram "rested constitutional confessions
law squarely upon the right against compulsory self-incrimination - not so surpris-
ingly since that had been the rule at common law since 1658." Urick, supra note
14, at 127 (footnote omitted).
34. See United States v. Carigan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) (questioning
"[wihether involuntary confessions are excluded from federal criminal trials on the
ground of a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimina-
tion, or from a rule that forced confessions are untrustworthy").
35. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.1(c), at 440; Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) ("[olver time.., cases recognized two constitutional bases
for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence:
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment").
36. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966) ("The standard of volun-
tariness which has evolved in state cases under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the same general standard which applied in federal
prosecutions - a standard grounded in the policies of the privilege against self-
incrimination.").
37. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.2(b), at 444; see generally Michael E.
Gering, Note, Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise of Free Will as an Independent
Basis for Finding a Confession Involuntary, 33 VILL. L. REV. 895, 898-907 (1988).
38. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.2(b), at 446. See, e.g., Beecher v. Ala-
bama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (holding a gun to a suspect's head); Brooks v. Florida,
389 U.S. 413, 414 (1967) (keeping accused naked and depriving him of water);
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1961) (depriving a suspect of adequate sleep);
9
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concern stems from when the confessions "were obtained by of-
fensive police practices even if reliability is not in question (for
example, where there is strong corroborating evidence)." 39 Fi-
nally, there is concern where confessions "were obtained under
circumstances in which the defendant's free choice was signifi-
cantly impaired, even if the police did not resort to offensive
practices."40 Subsequently, however, the Court appears to have
abandoned the third rationale for excluding confessions when it
ruled that "[aibsent police conduct causally related to the con-
fession there is simply no basis for concluding that any state
actor has deprived a defendant of due process of law."41
In Miranda, the Court ruled that "[u]nless adequate protec-
tive devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from [a] defen-
dant can truly be the product of his free choice."42 As a result,
Miranda requires that before questioning a suspect in cus-
tody,43 law enforcement officials must inform the suspect of his
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958) (threatening a suspect with mob
violence and depriving him of food); Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403
(1945) (accused stripped and kept naked); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29,
§ 6.2(c), at 446 (discussing some of the practices which have been found to violate a
suspect's rights to due process).
39. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.2(b), at 446; see Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (convictions based on coerced confessions must be over-
turned "not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the meth-
ods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial not an inquisitorial system").
40. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.2(b), at 446; see, e.g., Townsend v. Slain,
372 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1963) (although confession was apparently reliable and no
conscious police wrongdoing was involved, its use was impermissible since "[any
questioning by police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the
product of free intellect renders that confession inadmissible").
41. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986). "In essence, Connelly dis-
tinguished mental incapacity from coercion. Connelly held that as long as govern-
mental officers have not induced a mentally ill suspect's confession, the
Constitution poses no bar to admitting this confession in evidence." Albert W. Al-
schuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 957, 959 (1997). See gen-
erally Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now? 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 2001 (1998) (analyzing the treatment of involuntary discussions by the Su-
preme Court).
42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
43. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is both in custody
and subject to interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).
Whether a suspect is in custody turns on the degree to which restrictions on the
suspect's freedom of movement are "of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss1/1
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rights. 44 Before the government may introduce a suspect's in-
criminating statement in its case-in-chief,45 it must prove that
the accused voluntarily, 46 knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights under Miranda.47
To recapitulate, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination allows a defendant to move to suppress his
confession if it was involuntary or obtained in violation of Mi-
randa. While interrelated, these challenges to the admissibility
of a confession are different. 43 If a defendant's confession was
obtained by "'techniques and methods offensive to due process'
or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no op-
portunity to exercise 'a free and unconstrained will,'" his state-
ment is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. 49 The
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). Furthermore, "the initial determination of custody de-
pends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."
Stansburg v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). Generally, interrogation has
been defined as "express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
44. Miranda generally provides that before questioning a suspect who is in
custody, law enforcement officials must inform the suspect that: (i) he has the right
to remain silent; (ii) any statement he makes may be used against him at trial; (iii)
he has the right to be represented by an attorney during questioning; and (iv) if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478-79. Law enforcement officials must use this formulation or "other procedures
[that] are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Id. at 467.
45. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may nonetheless be used for
impeachment as long as they are voluntary. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
46. The voluntariness standard governing a Miranda waiver is the same as
that applied when assessing the voluntariness of a confession. Connelly, 479 U.S.
at 169-70.
47. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-84 (1981).
48. See Tankleffv. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir. 1998). See generally
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 ("The requirement that Miranda
warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.").
49. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (quoting Haynes v. Washing-
ton, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963)). In determining whether a confession has been co-
erced, a court will look at a number of factors including: (i) the age, education and
intelligence of the defendant; (ii) the length of the detention; (iii) the length and
nature of the questioning; (iv) whether the defendant was advised of his constitu-
tional rights; and (v) whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(2001) (admissibility of confessions). The admission into evidence of a confession
determined to be involuntary is subject to harmless constitutional error analysis.
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991).
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prophylactic rule of Miranda, however, is broader and requires
the suppression of some confessions that, while perhaps not ac-
tually involuntary, were obtained in the presumptively coercive
environment of police custody.50
III. The Application of the Self-Incrimination Clause To
Confessions Given by Non-Resident Aliens To
American Law Enforcement Officers
As discussed above, the admission into evidence of a state-
ment by an accused typically will be subject to challenge on the
grounds that it was not given voluntarily and that government
agents did not comply with Miranda when eliciting the state-
ment.51 When the accused is a non-resident alien and the state-
ment was provided to American law enforcement officials
abroad, novel issues as to the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment are presented. 52
A. The Self-Incrimination Clause and Voluntariness of a
Confession
The first significant post-Miranda case, which addressed
the application of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
clause to the interrogation of a non-resident alien abroad by fed-
eral American law enforcement officials, was United States v.
50. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
654 (1984) ("The Miranda Court ... presumed that interrogation in certain custo-
dial circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made under
those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of
his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights.") (footnote omitted); see
also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 ("The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that
statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is
aware of his 'rights,' may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as
a result.").
51. As noted by the Court in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20
(1984), however, "cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that
a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law en-
forcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare."
52. Resident aliens and other aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States are entitled to the same protections under the self-incrimination and due
process clauses as American citizens. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 672; Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
(1953). See generally Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., con-
curring) (aliens enjoy First, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendment protection rights).
[Vol. 22:1
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Yunis. 53 In Yunis, the defendant, a Lebanese citizen prosecuted
for the hijacking of a Jordanian airplane in 1985, moved to sup-
press his confession on the grounds that it was obtained in vio-
lation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, 54 and the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c) which prohibits unrea-
sonable delay before presentment to a magistrate after a confes-
sion is obtained. 55 The district court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress his confession and the government
appealed.5 6
In reversing the district court's ruling suppressing the con-
fession, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit accepted the parties' stipulation that the de-
fendant, "despite his alien status," could claim the protection of
the Fifth Amendment.5 7 In his concurrence, however, Judge
Mikva noted that the court was not "free to enter into constitu-
53. 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
54. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988). With respect to
the Fifth Amendment challenge to the confession, the court framed the inquiry in
terms of whether defendant's confession complied with the standards of Miranda
and "other like pronouncements of [the] Supreme Court." Id. at 922.
55. Under the rule established by the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory u. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957),
courts sometimes suppressed confessions obtained shortly after arrest on the
grounds that there had been an unnecessary delay in the arraignment of the ac-
cused. Section 3501(c) sets forth two exceptions to the McNabb-Mallory rule.
First, it provides that no confession will be excluded solely on the grounds of "un-
necessary delay" if it was obtained within six hours of arrest. Second, this grace
period may be extended if "the delay in bringing [the accused] before such magis-
trate ... beyond such six hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable
considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the
nearest available . . .magistrate[.]" 18 U.S.C. 3501(c).
56. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909. The district court ruled that Yunis's confession
was involuntary, in part because it was elicited "in an oppressive environment"
and was the result of "relentless interrogation[.]" Id. at 926. The court also "deter-
mined that the government purposely created the delay between arrest and the
arraignment to interrogate [Yunis] and secure a statement. That deliberate action
coupled with the lengthy and relentless interrogation was all to defendant's
prejudice and detriment and violated the provisions of 3501(c)." Id. at 927.
57. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 957. The court observed:
The parties have stipulated that Yunis, despite his alien status, can claim
the protection of the fifth amendment to the American Constitution for in-
terrogation that occurred outside the territory of the United States ....
Since the majority of the panel are of the view that such a stipulation is
acceptable and the application of the fifth amendment can be assumed argu-
endo, we turn to the standard of review.
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tional hypotheticals," and explained why, in his view, the Fifth
Amendment applied to non-resident aliens interrogated abroad
by American law enforcement officers.
First, Judge Mikva noted that the focus of the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against self-incrimination was "the use of
compelled, self-incriminatory evidence against the defendant at
trial."5 8 This use, Judge Mikva reasoned, occurs when the gov-
ernment seeks to introduce the statement of the accused at the
trial. For this reason, and relying on Brulay v. United States,59
where the defendant who was an American citizen sought to
suppress his statements to Mexican officials on the grounds
that they were involuntary, 60 Judge Mikva determined that: "if
the statement is not voluntarily given, whether given to a
United States or foreign officer-the defendant has been com-
pelled to be a witness against himself when the statement is
admitted."61 Judge Mikva further found support for his conclu-
sion, by analogy, in Supreme Court precedent holding that com-
pelled testimony under a grant of immunity may "not be put to
any testimonial use whatever against [a defendant] in a crimi-
nal trial."62
Between the time Yunis was decided and Judge Sand is-
sued his ruling in Bin Laden (discussed in detail below), the Su-
preme Court held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez63 that
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to foreign searches by
58. Id. at 970 (Mikva, J., concurring specially).
59. 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
60. Id. at 349.
61. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 971 (quoting Brulay, 383 F.2d at 349 n.5). In United
States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1987), which also involved an American de-
fendant who challenged the admissibility of his statement to Mexican authorities
on self-incrimination and due process grounds, the court noted that there was "ap-
parent tension" between Brulay and the Supreme Court's ruling in Connelly that
the introduction of evidence in a judicial proceeding did not by itself satisfy the
state action requirement for triggering the constitutional protection against invol-
untary confessions. Id. at 972 n.3, 975 n.16. The parties had not briefed the issue,
however, and the court "assume[d] without deciding that the constitutional protec-
tion against involuntary confessions applie[d] to confessions coerced by foreign po-
lice." Id. at 972 n.3. Yunis was decided prior to Connelly, leaving open the validity
of the court's observation that if the involuntary statement was obtained by a for-
eign officer, its admission into evidence would violate the Fifth Amendment.
62. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 971 (quoting Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459
(1979)).
63. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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American law enforcement officials involving property of non-
resident aliens with "no voluntary connection" to the United
States.64 The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez reasoned that unlike
the Fifth Amendment which protects all "persons," the Fourth
Amendment protects only "the people" of the United States. 65
The term "people," the Court found, "refer[red] to a class of per-
sons who are part of a national community or who have other-
wise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community."66 Thus, the aftermath of
Verdugo-Urquidez appears to be that citizens of foreign nations
are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection during foreign
searches.67
In dictum, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez noted that the
Fifth Amendment did not apply extraterritorially to non-resi-
dent aliens. 68 For its dictum, the Court relied on Johnson v.
Eisentranger.69 In Johnson, a United States Military Commis-
sion convicted twenty-one German nationals, who had never
been in United States territory, for attempting to inform the
Japanese of United States troop movements before Japan's sur-
render in World War 11.70 In their petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus, petitioners alleged that their trial, conviction,
and imprisonment violated Articles I and III of the Constitu-
tion, as well as the Fifth Amendment. 71 The Court rejected this
contention and ruled that "the Constitution d[id] not confer a
right of personal security or an immunity from military trial
and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States."72
In denying enemy alien war criminals the right to habeas
corpus relief, it has been noted that the Court focused intently
on the differences between the rights of friendly and enemy
64. Id. at 261.
65. Id. at 265-66.
66. Id.
67. See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991).
68. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 ("we have rejected the claim that
aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the
United States").
69. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
70. Id. at 766.
71. Id. at 767.
72. Id. at 785.
2001]
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aliens, and that "[i]t was the existence of war between the
United States and the alien's [sic] homeland, not their alienage,
which reduced the enemy alien's rights. This reduction was jus-
tified because of the need to ensure war time security."73 Ac-
cordingly, some maintain that while Johnson "stands for the
proposition that the courts may deny habeas corpus to enemy
aliens in occupied territories during a declared war, the decision
does not apply to the general treatment of non-enemy aliens
abroad."74
In the recent prosecution of several foreign nationals
charged with the bombing of the American Embassies in Nai-
robi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Judge Sand ruled in
Bin Laden that non-resident aliens were entitled to the same
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination as suspects
questioned in the United States. 75 Notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court's dictum in Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to non-resident aliens extraterritori-
73. Bryan William Horn, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth
Amendment Protection Against Coerced Self-Incrimination, 2 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 367, 378 (1992) (footnotes omitted); see also Leigh-Ann Patterson, Com-
ment, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment - United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 289, 294 (1991)
(the Court in Johnson "focused extensively on the special national security dangers
posed by an enemy alien, narrowing its holding by noting that 'enemy' status, not
'alien' status, deprived aliens of both interterritorial and extraterritorial protec-
tions during war") (footnote omitted).
74. John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitu-
tional Limitations to Federal Actions, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 302-03
(1985) (footnotes omitted); see Horn, supra note 73, at 379 ("[w~hile there may be
wars on drugs or terrorism now, such campaigns are not the type envisioned by the
holding in Johnson") (footnote omitted). But see Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596,
604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (while Johnson concerned the rights of enemy aliens during
wartime, "the Supreme Court's extended and approving citation of [Johnson] in
[Verdugo-Urquidez] suggests that its conclusions regarding extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment are not so limited"); Paul B. Stephan, III, Constitu-
tional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L.
777, 781 n.14 (1980) ("[Johnson] involved enemy aliens who had borne arms
against the United States. Although the Court regarded this fact as important, its
opinion did not stress the distinction and much of the argument advanced therein
applies with equal force to foreign nationals other than enemy aliens.").
75. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181. But see United States v. Raven, 103 F.
Supp. 2d 38, 39 (D. Mass. 2000) (relying on Johnson for the proposition that
"[w]hen the questioning takes place overseas ... foreign nationals do not benefit
from the protections of the United States Constitution").
[Vol. 22:1
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ally, the court in Bin Laden, after a thorough analysis of this
issue, reached a different conclusion.
To begin with, Judge Sand observed that the protective
reach of the Fifth Amendment to persons located outside of the
United States was not the issue since "any violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination occurs, not at the moment law
enforcement officials coerce statements through custodial inter-
rogation, but when a defendant's involuntary statements are
actually used against him at an American criminal proceed-
ing."76 In that regard, it is noteworthy that the majority in
Verdugo-Urquidez agreed with the principle that the right
against self-incrimination is triggered when an attempt is made
to introduce the confession at trial. The Court there observed:
"The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment is a fundamental right of criminal defend-
ants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to
trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation
occurs only at trial."77
Second, Judge Sand found that the "expansive language"
used in the Fifth Amendment, in particular, the reference to
"person" as opposed to "'the people' [found] in most of the other
Amendments contained within the Bill of Rights," suggested
that its "protections seemingly apply with equal vigor to all de-
fendants facing criminal prosecution at the hands of the United
States, and without apparent regard to citizenship or commu-
nity connection."78 Here again, it deserves mention that in his
76. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82 (footnote omitted). Judge Sand fur-
ther noted that if the opposite were true, "then no statute compelling witness im-
munity under grants of immunity could withstand constitutional challenge." Id. at
182.
77. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264; see Deshawn E. by Charolette E. v.
Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Even if it can be shown that a statement
was obtained by coercion, there can be no Fifth Amendment violation until that
statement is introduced against the defendant in a criminal proceeding."). Pre-
cisely for this reason, Judge Sand found the government's reliance on Johnson was
"fundamentally misplaced" since the putative injury there occurred entirely
abroad. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.10. Additionally, Judge Sand distin-
guished Johnson on the ground that it involved "a specific kind of non-resident
alien 'the subject of a foreign state at war with the United States'" and also a trial
and conviction under a military commission not an Article III court. Id. (quoting
Johnson 339 U.S. at 769 n.2).
78. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183. When the person is an American citi-
zen, the protections of the Fifth Amendment would attach with respect to conduct
20011
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concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy re-
jected the social compact theory as "irrelevant to any construc-
tion of the powers conferred or the limitations imposed" by the
Constitution. 79 Describing the right of the defendant in that
case, Justice Kennedy stated: "The United States is prosecuting
a foreign national in a court established under Article III, and
all of the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution.
All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant."80
Furthermore, Judge Sand observed that the Supreme
Court has ruled that the right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment applies to non-resident aliens who are tried in the
United States irrespective of "their level of 'insertion' into
American society."8i And, while "the Supreme Court has yet to
rule affirmatively that the three remaining Fifth Amendment
procedural guarantees - indictment by grand jury, bar on
involving American law enforcement officials abroad. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 10-14 (1956) (territorial boundaries cannot limit the Constitution's full applica-
tion to citizens abroad). See generally, Roszell D. Hunter, IV, Note, The Extraterri-
torial Application of the Constitution - Unalienable Rights? 72 VA. L. REv. 649,
662-64 (1986).
79. 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The compact theory advocates
that aliens "abroad are neither parties to nor beneficiaries of the agreement be-
tween the federal government and its people embodied in the Constitution." Ste-
phan, supra note 74, at 782. And, the argument goes, "[eJxtending rights to
[overseas] aliens, to individuals who are not parties to the compact between the
federal government and its people, is contrary to this tradition and should be re-
jected unless it can be said that, by doing so, substantial benefits will inure to U.S.
citizens." Id. at 785. However, some have maintained that:
[t]his extension of social contract theory... takes a contract metaphor use-
ful for describing the Framer's view of the proper basis for the creation of
government, and attempts to use it as a rigid rule for limiting constitutional
protection. The Supreme Court ... has moved beyond such a narrow con-
struction of the Constitution in protecting aliens present in the United
States. The social contract metaphor provides no valid reason why constitu-
tional principles should not similarly restrict the government when it acts
on aliens outside this country. Respect for the natural rights of all persons
demands such restrictions.
Hunter, supra note 78, at 653 (footnotes omitted).
80. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183; see Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77 ("There are
literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these
persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Even those whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory
are entitled to that constitutional protection.").
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double jeopardy, and privilege against self-incrimination - ap-
ply to criminal defendants who are non-citizens" such a legal
void was "emblematic, not of doctrinal reticence, but of wide-
spread acceptance that these strictures apply universally to any
criminal prosecution brought by the U.S. within its own bor-
ders."8 2 Indeed, in the context of the prosecution in Bin Laden,
the parties had proceeded as if, in fact, the defendants pos-
sessed those rights.8 3 For example, the government had sought
a grand jury indictment nine times, the court reviewed the in-
dictment which was ultimately returned for multiplicitous
counts, and the wishes of the defendants not to testify at vari-
ous hearings were honored.8 4
Finally, Judge Sand noted how the Supreme Court has
urged that the privilege "'not be interpreted in a hostile or nig-
gardly spirit"'8 5 and concluded that "the policies undergirding
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination are
no less relevant when the criminal defendant at issue is an un-
connected, non-resident alien."8 6 Conceding that these policies
"may arguably lose their force when the fear of compelled self-
incrimination points to a prospective foreign prosecution,"
Judge Sand, relying on the fundamental and noble goals identi-
fied in Murphy as supporting the privilege,8 7 found that when a
defendant is "prosecuted within the United States, before a
United States court, for alleged violations of United States law,
having been previously and thoroughly interrogated by U.S. law
enforcement - then the Government's use of a coerced confes-
sion against him would still have the debilitating effect of in-
fecting our criminal justice system."88
But what if the statement is elicited by foreign law enforce-
ment officials? Can a non-resident alien challenge the volunta-
riness of that statement on Fifth Amendment grounds if the
government subsequently seeks to introduce it in a prosecution
of the non-resident alien in an American court?
82. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 184.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 185 (quoting Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426).
86. Id. at 184.
87. See supra text accompanying note 27.
88. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (citation omitted).
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There is support in the case law for the proposition that an
American citizen, in a domestic prosecution, can challenge the
admission of a statement given by him to foreign law enforce-
ment officials on the grounds that it was not voluntarily made.
Over one hundred years ago, in Bram v. United States,8 9 the
defendant challenged the admission into evidence of statements
made by him to Canadian officials on voluntariness grounds,
and the Court held that such statements had erroneously been
admitted and reversed the conviction. 90 Subsequent federal
cases, likewise, have found that the constitutional protection
against coerced confessions applies when the statements at is-
sue were made by citizens to foreign officials. 91
Similarly, in at least one federal case involving the admissi-
bility of statements made by a non-resident alien to foreign law
enforcement officials, the court found that "[i]t could conceiva-
bly be argued that the prohibition against self-incrimination
may still apply to a foreign interrogation even if the require-
ments of Miranda do not."92 The court then went on to rule
that, assuming the standard governing voluntariness applied in
89. 168 U.S. at 532.
90. Id.
91. See United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); Kilday v.
United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973); Brulay, 383 F.2d at 349. But see
Wolf, 813 F.2d at 972 n.3 (assuming "without deciding that the constitutional pro-
tection against involuntary confessions applies to confessions coerced by foreign
police"). Brulay relied on Bram. In a number of other cases after Brulay, federal
courts have ruled that a statement obtained by foreign law enforcement officials
abroad will not be admissible in a subsequent prosecution of the defendant in the
United States unless the statement was made voluntarily. See, e.g., United States
v. Martindale, 790 F.2d 1129, 1131 (4th Cir. 1986) (admissions by the defendant in
interviews with British officers were admissible absent proof of duress); United
States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 69 (2d Cir. 1983) (no contention that admissions by
defendant to Canadian officials obtained by duress or in violation of Canadian
law); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[wlhenever a court
is asked to rule upon the admissibility of a statement made to a foreign police
officer, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the statement was voluntary"); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904,
905 (9th Cir. 1971) (record contained no proof that statement by defendant to Mex-
ican police was coerced). It is unclear from the opinions in those cases whether the
defendant was an American citizen, permanent resident of the United States, or a
foreign national.
92. United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F.Supp. 1253, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
affd sub nom, United States v. DiTomasso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987). The de-
fendant in that case was a "Spanish National." Id. at 1257.
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the context of foreign interrogation, the statements were
"clearly voluntary" and would not be suppressed.9 3
These cases, however, all arose prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Connelly that the introduction of evidence in a
judicial proceeding does not, by itself, satisfy the state action
requirement.9 4 Whether Connelly's rationale would foreclose an
American citizen or non-resident alien from challenging the ad-
missibility of a statement obtained by foreign government offi-
cials on Fifth Amendment grounds does not appear to have yet
been decided by any court.9 5 To the extent that foreign govern-
ment officials are engaged in a joint venture with American law
enforcement officials, an argument could be made by non-resi-
dent aliens (under Yunis and Bin Laden) and citizens that the
protections of the Fifth Amendment attach to statements given
to such officials.9 6 Whether a viable challenge could be made on
93. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. at 1263. In support of its ruling, the court
relied on Brulay and the observation by the Supreme Court in Elstad that "[wihere
an unwarned statement is preserved for use in situations that fall outside the
sweep of the Miranda presumption, the primary criterion of admissibility [re-
mains] the 'old' due process voluntariness test." Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at
307-08 (quoting Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 865, 877 (1981)).
94. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163. The appeal in Molina-Chacon was argued the
day after the Court issued its opinion in Connelly and in DiTomasso, which fol-
lowed Connelly, did not address the voluntariness issue.
95. See Wolf, 813 F.2d at 972 n.3 (assuming "without deciding that the consti-
tutional protection against involuntary confessions applies to confessions coerced
by foreign police"); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights
Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 775 (1980)
(maintaining that the Constitution "require[s] that U.S. proceedings be conducted
fairly. Unreliable evidence (such as coerced confessions) may be excluded in order
to protect the fact finding process - not to control the activities of foreign law en-
forcement personnel"); Steve M. Kaplan, Note, The Applicability of the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Federal Court to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained on Foreign
Countries, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 511 (1977) ("One important difference
in the protection offered by the two amendments is that the Fifth Amendment's
bar against self-incrimination creates a threshold criterion that a statement or
confession must have been voluntarily given, regardless of whether there had been
American participation in the questioning from which it resulted.").
96. See Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[u]nder the joint venture doctrine, evidence obtained through activities of foreign
officials, in which federal agents substantially participated and which violated the
accused's Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights, must be suppressed in a subse-
quent trial in the United States"); United States v. Covington, 783 F.2d 1052, 1056
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[tlhe extent of involvement of United States officials ... becomes a
vital inquiry").
21
22 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1
the grounds that the confession was elicited by methods that
shocked the conscience is unclear.97
B. Advice of Rights Under Miranda
American law enforcement officials are bound by Miranda
when they interrogate American citizens on foreign soil.98
Yunis, as noted above, appears to be the first reported case
where a court analyzed the extension of Miranda to foreign na-
tionals interrogated by American law enforcement officials
abroad. 99 The parties' stipulation in Yunis that a non-resident
alien was entitled to the protections of Miranda directly led the
court to an analysis of whether the defendant had voluntarily
and intelligently waived his rights.
The court in Bin Laden, however, squarely confronted this
question and ruled that Miranda's reach extended to the inter-
rogation of non-resident aliens abroad by American law enforce-
ment officials. 100 Judge Sand began his analysis by noting that
97. See United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970)
("There is no showing that the statement was coerced or taken in violation of the
laws of Canada. There is no claim of'rubbing pepper in the eyes,' or o[thler shock-
ing conduct."); Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp at 1262; see also Jessica W. Julian, The
Capture of a State Leader, 34 A.F.L. REV. 153, 186 (1991) (maintaining that "the
general trend suggests that the right to a fair trial provided in the fifth amend-
ment does extend to nonresident aliens being tried in an American tribunal and
may be used to bar self-incriminating statements which were involuntarily made,
even if made to foreign officers"); Kaplan, supra note 95, at 514 ("The 'shocking
conduct' standard . . . like the other standards evolved in the areas of foreign-
seized evidence and confessions, remains ambiguous; it is unclear precisely how
shocking the conduct has to be before evidence obtained as a result of that conduct
is excluded."); Saltzburg, supra note 95, at 775 (footnotes omitted) (arguing that
"fundamental international norms of decency are incorporated in domestic law,"
and that "courts may want to exclude evidence obtained abroad by foreign officials
in violation of such norms in order to demonstrate that no civilized nation should
countenance violations of fundamental human rights").
98. See Cranford v. Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1970).
99. Government agents in Yunis informed the defendant that "he would be
afforded all the rights of a citizen of the United States and that he didn't have to be
concerned with the fact that he wasn't an American ... " Yunis, 859 F.2d at 956.
The confession was obtained while the defendant was aboard a naval warship in
the Mediterranean in transit to the United States. Id. at 954.
100. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 185-89. Judge Sand posited the question
as follows:
Assume for purposes of this discussion these generalized facts: An individ-
ual held in custody of foreign police is suspected of having violated both local
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the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings - the heart-
land of Miranda's rationale - was "clearly no less troubling
when carried out beyond our borders and under the aegis of a
foreign 'station house."101 To the contrary, it was "far more
likely that a custodial interrogation held in such conditions
w[ould] present greater threats of compulsion since all that
happens to the accused cannot be controlled" by the American
law enforcement officials. 10 2 But what specific warnings should
be given?10 3 Judge Sand found that the first two traditional
warnings - that the suspect must be told that he has the right
to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against
him - were uncontroversial. 10 4 That portion of the Miranda
warnings addressing the assistance and presence of retained or
publicly appointed counsel, however, presented a different ques-
tion since those admonitions "may often be affected by the fact
that the suspect is being interrogated overseas and that he is in
the physical custody of a foreign nation."10 5 Those warnings,
and U.S. criminal law. As a matter of global comity, U.S. law enforcement
representatives are permitted inside the foreign stationhouse [sic] to pose
their own questions to the suspect. U.S. agents eventually succeed in ex-
tracting inculpatory statements, and the suspect is thereafter transported to
the United States for prosecution, with the consent of foreign authorities.
By what standards should a domestic court admit the above statements as
governmental evidence at trial?
Id. at 185. It should be noted, however, that in Raven, relying solely on Johnson
and essentially with no discussion or analysis, the court ruled that the right to
counsel implicated by the Fifth Amendment during questioning has no force when
a foreign national is interviewed abroad by American law enforcement officials.
Raven, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40. To the extent that the court in Raven was refer-
ring to the Miranda admonition relating to the right to counsel, Bin Laden force-
fully responds to why foreign nationals interrogated abroad by American law
enforcement officials are entitled to receive Miranda warnings. Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 185-89.
101. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
102. Id. As to the government's contention that it was "positively perverse"
that the admissibility of the statements by the defendants would not be subject to
Miranda if they had been the product of questioning by foreign police, Judge Sand
responded that there was "nothing at all anomalous in requiring our own Govern-
ment to abide by the strictures of our own Constitution whenever it seeks to con-
vict an accused, in our own courts, on the basis of admissions culled via an
inherently coercive interrogation conducted by our own law enforcement." Id. at
187 n.13.
103. See supra text accompanying note 44.
104. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88.
105. Id. at 188. Judge Sand made clear that "if the particular overseas con-
text actually presents no obvious hurdle to the implementation of an accused's
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Judge Sand reasoned, may be modified given the external con-
siderations that arise from foreign custody. As Judge Sand
explained:
The goal is to convey to a suspect that, with respect to any ques-
tioning by U.S. agents, his ability to exercise his right to the pres-
ence and assistance of counsel - a right ordinarily unqualified -
hinges on two external considerations arising from the fact of his
foreign custody. First, since there exists no institutional mecha-
nism for the international provision of an American court-ap-
pointed lawyer, the availability of public counsel overseas turns
chiefly on foreign law. Second, foreign law may also ban all man-
ner of defense counsel from even entering the foreign station
house, and such law necessarily trumps American procedure.
Given these eventualities, U.S. law enforcement can only do the
best they can to give full effect to a suspect's right to the presence
and assistance of counsel, while still respecting the ultimate au-
thority of the foreign sovereign. And if an attorney, whether ap-
pointed or retained, is truly and absolutely unavailable, and that
result remains unsatisfactory to the suspect, he should be told
that he need not speak to the Americans so long as he is without
legal representation. Moreover, even if the suspect opts to speak
without a lawyer present, he should know that he still has the
right to stop answering questions at any time. 0 6
In Yunis and Bin Laden, United States law enforcement
representatives were responsible for the questioning of the for-
eign suspects. When foreign law enforcement officials are in-
volved, however, courts unanimously have ruled that Miranda
warnings are "not essential to the validity of a confession which
has been given in a foreign country." 10 7 As the court explained
in United States v. Chavarria:
Miranda was intended as a deterrent to unlawful police interro-
gations. When the interrogation is by the authorities of a foreign
jurisdiction, the exclusionary rule has little or no effect upon the
conduct of the foreign police. Therefore, so long as the trustwor-
right to the assistance and presence of counsel, due care should be taken not to
foreclose an opportunity that in fact exists." Id. (footnotes omitted).
106. Id. at 188-89 (footnotes omitted).
107. Mundt, 508 F.2d at 906; accord Martindale, 790 F.2d at 1131-32 (4th Cir.
1986); Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 69; United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 273 (10th
Cir. 1977). As noted earlier, it is unclear from the opinions in some of these cases
whether the defendant was an American citizen, a resident alien, or a foreign
national.
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thiness of the confession satisfies legal standards, the fact that
the defendant was not given Miranda warnings before question-
ing by foreign police will not, by itself, render his confession
inadmissible. 108
The courts in these cases based their analysis on the lack of
application of the exclusionary rule, and not whether the Fifth
Amendment is triggered at all, given that foreign law enforce-
ment officials are involved.
The same principle regarding the exclusionary rule holds
true if the statements obtained by the foreign law enforcement
officials "violate the foreign law."10 9 If, however, American and
foreign law enforcement officials were engaged in a joint ven-
ture, 110 foreign law enforcement officers were acting as agents
of the United States, or it appears that the American authori-
ties willfully were attempting to evade the strictures of Mi-
randa by employing foreign authorities, the requirements of
Miranda may be applicable."'
108. Chavarria, 443 F.2d at 905. "It is well established, of course, that the
exclusionary rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private party
or a foreign government commits the offending act." United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976); see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166 ("The most outrageous
behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does
not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause."); Knapp, 357
U.S. at 380 ("purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is the security of the individual against the ... Federal Government").
109. Covington, 783 F.2d at 1056 ("the exclusionary rule is not applicable if
the statements are obtained by foreign officers in a foreign country even if it may
violate the foreign law").
110. See Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 877; United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1267
(9th Cir. 1978); Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. at 1262; cf. United States v. Shea,
436 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1970).
111. See Martindale, 790 F.2d at 1131-32; Covington, 783 F.2d at 1056;
United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980). As to the agency dis-
tinction, some commentators have observed:
[11n this context it will take a bit more to establish the requisite agency than
when police obtain the assistance of private citizens in this country. This is
because cooperative efforts among police agencies of different countries is a
natural and desirable arrangement, and thus should not be inherently sus-
pect as a likely effort to accomplish indirectly that which could not be done
directly. At least where the foreign police were also serving law enforce-
ment interests of their own country, it is not enough that American officers
have played a substantial role in events leading to the arrest or that the
cooperation has the character of a joint venture.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 29, § 6.10(e), at 625.
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IV. Conclusion
The trend in the case law suggests that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination extends to non-resi-
dent aliens interrogated abroad by American law enforcement
officials. As a result, a statement elicited by American law en-
forcement officials from a suspect abroad who is a non-resident
alien must be found to be voluntary before it is admitted into
evidence against the suspect in a domestic federal criminal
prosecution. The developing case law also indicates that at
least modified Miranda warnings must be administered to for-
eign suspects who are interrogated by American law enforce-
ment representatives abroad. How the Supreme Court would
rule on these issues, however, is not at all clear.
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